Forwarded Without Question: How Web Frameworks Overtrust the Forwarded Header
Web page · https://lkoskela.fi/blog/2026-11-05-forwarded-without-question
First seen by Oriel on .
AI summary
The investigation finds that mismatched defaults between web frameworks and proxies let attacker-supplied Forwarded headers spoof client IPs, hostnames, and protocols unless untrusted proxy headers are removed.
- Rails 8.1 began using Forwarded for client IPs, and Rails 8.1.4.1 expanded spoofing detection across Client-IP, X-Forwarded-For, and Forwarded.
- Jetty prioritizes Forwarded over X-Forwarded-* by default, allowing IP, hostname, and scheme spoofing when proxies pass client-supplied Forwarded headers unchanged.
- Spring Boot 4.2 now parses only X-Forwarded-* by default, while Spring Framework 7.1 and Reactor Netty 1.4 require explicitly selecting a header family.
- Symfony rejects conflicting enabled header families, but hostname spoofing can remain possible when Forwarded contains host and the proxy does not set X-Forwarded-Host.
- Most tested reverse proxies primarily handle X-Forwarded-* and pass Forwarded through unchanged, creating unsafe interactions with frameworks that trust or prioritize it.
#web security #reverse proxies #http headers #web frameworks
Generated by gpt-5.6-sol. Check the original for details.
Metric trends
Last 30 days · Up to 120 recorded samples per source and metric, with reposts kept separate · First and latest retained
Points
Score reported by the source.
- Lobsters: 10, latest observation ; +9 over observed period since
Comments
Comment count reported by the source.
- Lobsters: 0, latest observation ; 0 over observed period since
Aliases
| Source | External ID | URL |
|---|---|---|
| Lobsters | m5kism | https://www.lkoskela.fi/blog/2026-11-05-forwarded-without-question/ Read discussion |