Adversarial Risk in the Generative AI Era Necessitates Dropping the Small Epsilon Ball
Paper · https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.14594
arXiv:2611.14594v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Adversarial Machine Learning research is currently centered on the search for the epsilon-ball: minimal perturbations designed to fool models while remaining imperceptible to humans. We argue that this fixation on $\ell_p$ norms is a metrological trap that communicates a distorted perception of risk to defenders, one that is unaligned with real-world system vulnerabilities. This paradigm misleads defenders into optimizing for narrow, mathematical robustness at the expense of systemic security, while simultaneously incentivizing attackers to exploit non-overlapping alternative adversarial pathways. Ultimately, we argue that the dominance of the $\ell_p$ ball does not just fail to reduce harm---it may actively facilitate it by communicating a false sense of security against the wrong threats.
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AI summary
This paper argues that adversarial machine learning’s focus on imperceptible $ell_p$-bounded perturbations misrepresents real-world risk and can create a false sense of security.
- The authors characterize the search for minimal, human-imperceptible perturbations as a metrological trap.
- They argue that optimizing narrow mathematical robustness can divert defenders from systemic security vulnerabilities.
- The epsilon-ball focus may incentivize attackers to pursue alternative adversarial pathways outside the modeled perturbation space.
- The paper concludes that $ell_p$-ball dominance may actively facilitate harm by communicating protection against the wrong threats.
#adversarial machine learning #generative ai #ai security
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Aliases
| Source | External ID | URL |
|---|---|---|
| arXiv AI Papers | oai:arXiv.org:2611.14594v1 | https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.14594 Read discussion |